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Abstract
This paper provides a simple model of the rescheduling of debt
following a sovereign default as a bond exchange. In case of default,
the sovereign oﬀers a new bond with lower coupon and principal. The
debtors accept the oﬀer if the value of the new bonds is higher than
the proceedings of the litigation of the sovereign. Both the default
decision of the sovereign as well as the exchange oﬀer are modeled
endogenously and in closed form. The resulting formulas for bond
value and credit spreads are in closed form as well.
The analysis yields credit spread curves similar to corporate credit
curves: For high risk issuers, i.e., sovereign with low country wealth
relative to debt level, and high litigation costs, the credit spread curves
are “hump”-shaped. Better quality issues exhibit increasing credit
spread curves. The numerical analysis with reasonable parameters
yields credit spreads of a size compatible to market spreads.
A comparison to corporate debt supports the stylized fact that,
using the same parameters, corporate debt is less risky than sovereign
debt since the threat of liquidation is stronger than the threat of liti-
gation.
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Executive summary
Sovereign debt cannot be priced or analyzed using a model developed for
corporate debt because sovereign debt is diﬀerent from corporate debt: If a
sovereign does not repay the amount which is speciﬁed in the debt contract
it is not possible to initiate proceedings in a bankruptcy court which allow
the lenders to seize all assets of the borrower. This implies that there are
greater incentives for a sovereign to strategically default, i.e., to pay less than
the contractual amount even if there are enough resources to fulﬁll the debt
contract.
To take account of this behavior, my paper focuses rather on the country’s
willingness or incentives to fully honor its obligations than on its ability to
do so. In this respect, the model diﬀers from classical corporate credit risk
models. It is not a drop of the company’s asset value under the outstanding
face value which triggers default, but rather a decision of the country whether
to continue in respecting its commitments or whether to default. However,
my model uses the framework of models of corporate credit risk, and extends
it to incorporate features speciﬁc to sovereign credit risk and sovereign debt
reorganization.
I directly model the dynamics of the country’s wealth, i.e., I do not specify
the production side of the sovereign’s economy. Furthermore, I assume that
there exists one utility function which describes the interests of the country.
I do not allow, for instance, that the politicians in the government have
interests diﬀerent from the citizens of the country.
Default is designed such that the country does not continue to honor
the original debt contract. Instead it oﬀers a new contract with reduced
coupon and principal repayments. After default, however, the sovereign has
to face costs due to e.g. sanctions, disruptions in trade or loss of reputation,
which result in reduced growth of its wealth. The recent defaults of Ecuador
on its Brady bonds and some Eurobonds in 2000, Pakistan on three dollar
denominated Eurobonds in 1999, the Ukraine on Eurobonds in 2000 and
Russia in 2000 on the so called Prins and Ians support the modeling of a
sovereign default as a bond exchange of the original bonds for new bonds
with lower value.
1The decision whether to default or not is made by comparing the expected
terminal wealth, considering debt service and costs of default, under both
scenarios. The level of country wealth at which the sovereign will be just
indiﬀerent between fulﬁlling its duty and defaulting, i.e., the level of wealth
which triggers default, is named the endogenous default boundary.
Recent successful litigation of Peru shows that sovereigns face a litigation
threat by the lenders. If the sovereign oﬀers a bond exchange with too bad
conditions, the lenders will try to seize foreign assets held by the sovereign.
However, they are not able to recuperate the full principal. Part will be
lost due to litigation costs, both explicit, i.e., lawyer fees etc., and implicit
costs of defaulting: Because there is no formal bankruptcy court for sovereign
debt, it is very diﬃcult for the creditors to ﬁnd a way to sue the sovereign,
rendering a full recuperation of the principal impossible.
By assuming that the sovereign will always oﬀer a new debt contract such
that the lenders are indiﬀerent between accepting and litigating, I endogenize
the fraction of the original contractual obligations the sovereign continues to
honor after default.
Even although the default boundary is time dependent, I ﬁnd closed form
solution for the default triggering wealth level, sovereign bond prices and
credit spreads by applying an eﬃcient approximation developed by Durbin
(1992). Numerical analysis shows an important inverse relation between
the credit spreads of sovereign debt and the amount that can be recuper-
ated through litigation. The distance of the country’s wealth to the default
boundary inﬂuences the credit spreads inversely as well, while an increasing
size of the coupon leads to higher spreads.
I compare sovereign debt to domestic corporate debt by analyzing the
impact of the bankruptcy scheme: While a sovereign will be litigated for the
principal, a corporation will be liquidated, i.e., all the assets of the corpora-
tion will be transferred to the lenders, minus the liquidation costs.
The stronger threat of liquidation leads corporates to wait longer until
they default than sovereigns. This leads to considerably lower spreads of
corporate bonds. If, in addition, we also assume lower liquidation costs for
the corporate, the spreads decrease even more.
The behavior of the credit spread curves is similar to the credit spreads
obtained by the classic models of corporate credit spreads such as Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz as well as Leland and Toft.
21 Introduction
While the literature of corporate credit risk is advancing at a rapid pace,
the issue of sovereign credit risk is still in its early stages. Sovereign debt is
diﬀerent from corporate debt: If a sovereign does not repay the amount which
is speciﬁed in the debt contract it is not possible to initiate proceedings in a
bankruptcy court which allow the lenders to seize all assets of the borrower.
This implies that there are greater incentives for a sovereign to strategically
default, i.e., to pay less than the contractual amount even if there are enough
resources to fulﬁll the debt contract.
To take account of these factors we will focus on the country’s willingness
or incentives to fully honor its obligations rather than on its ability to do so.
The model diﬀers from classical corporate credit risk models: It is not the
dropping of the company’s asset value under the outstanding face value which
triggers default, but rather a decision of the country whether to continue in
respecting its commitments or whether to default.
The beneﬁts of defaulting are that the outstanding debt will be reorga-
nized. The sovereign oﬀers a bond exchange: Bond holders can change their
defaulted bonds into new bonds with a lower coupon and principal.
The punishment will come in the shape reduced growth of country wealth.
The reasons for the reduced growth are either direct trade sanctions in the
Bulow and Rogoﬀ sense, or the economic costs of lost reputation,in the debt
market as well as spillover into other markets, i.e., the loss of the reputation as
a trustworthy business partner. Furthermore, creditors can utilize the threat
of litigation, i.e., the lenders will try to recuperate part of the principal by
seizing assets of the sovereign held abroad.
The model itself is based on models of corporate credit risk, which are
extended to incorporate features speciﬁc to sovereign credit risk and sovereign
debt reorganization. It takes the idea of an endogenous bankruptcy rule as a
ﬂow condition from Kim, Ramaswamy and Sundaresan [27] whose model has
corporations defaulting when the ﬁrm does not generate enough cash ﬂow to
meet contractual coupon payments.
We begin by modeling the dynamics of the country’s wealth, incorporat-
ing debt service. Since it would be necessary to explicitly model the produc-
tion side of the sovereign’s economy to estimate the cost of the defaulting
and the beneﬁt of the debt relief in case of default, or to at least assume an
ad-hoc ‘utility’ function for the country, we will assume, following Bulow and
Rogoﬀ [6], that the sovereign seeks to maximize terminal country wealth, i.e.,
that it has a linear utility function. This assumption is limiting in the sense
that we assume that there exists one utility function which describes the
interests of the country. We do not allow, for instance, that the politicians
3in the government have interests diﬀerent from the citizens of the country.
Default is designed such that the country does not continue to honor the
original debt contract. Instead it oﬀers a new contract with reduced coupon
and principal repayments. After default, however, the sovereign has to face
costs due to e.g. sanctions, disruptions in trade or loss of reputation1,w h i c h
result in reduced growth of its wealth.
The recent defaults2 of Ecuador on its Brady bonds and some Eurobonds
in 2000, Pakistan on three dollar denominated Eurobonds in 1999, the Ukra-
ine on Eurobonds in 2000 and Russia in 2000 on the so called Prins and
Ians3 support our modeling of a sovereign default as a bond exchange of the
original bonds for new bonds with lower value. However, the reality is more
complicated.
Our model assumes a simple exchange of the original bonds for new bonds
with the same maturity date but a coupon rate and a principal which are
reduced by the same proportion. For example, a sovereign bond with a 10%
coupon on a principal of $ 100 would be exchanged for instance into a bond
with 4% coupon on a principal of $ 40, with the same maturity.
Apart from the fact that coupon and principal are rarely reduced by the
same proportion, sovereigns also often oﬀer a “sweetener” to induce bond
holders to tender: When Ecuador proposed its exchange oﬀer in July 2000,
it oﬀered about $ 1 bn in cash to bond holders in addition to the new bonds.
Russia’s exchange oﬀer for its Prins and Ians in February 2000 included an
upgrade in obligor to the Russian Federation4.
The most important feature of the mentioned bond exchanges however is
that they proposed to exchange bonds close to maturity against bonds with
longer maturity. For instance, Pakistan proposed in November 1999 to ex-
change bonds due in December 1999, February 2002 (with a put in February
2000) and May 2000 against a bond maturing in 2005. This delayed repay-
ment of principal and interest of course constitutes a loss in present value
terms to the bond holders. We do not explicitly model the later repayment
but instead include it in the reduction of the principal and the coupon.
The decision whether to default or not is made by comparing the expected
terminal wealth, considering debt service and costs of default, under both
scenarios. The level of country wealth at which the sovereign will be just
indiﬀerent between fulﬁlling its duty and defaulting, i.e., the level of wealth
which triggers default, will be named the endogenous default boundary.
Recent successful litigation of Peru5 shows that sovereigns face a litigation
threat by the lenders. If the sovereign oﬀers a bond exchange with too bad
conditions, the lenders will try to seize foreign assets held by the sovereign.
However, they are not able to recuperate the full principal. Part will be lost
due to litigation costs. By assuming that the sovereign will always oﬀer a
4new debt contract such that the lenders are indiﬀerent between accepting and
litigating6, we endogenize the fraction of the original contractual obligations
the sovereign continues to honor after default.
The model provides a closed form solution for the default triggering
wealth level, sovereign bond prices and credit spreads. However, the endoge-
nous repayment fraction has to be solved numerically. Numerical analysis
shows an important inverse relation between the credit spreads of sovereign
debt and the amount that can be recuperated through litigation. The dis-
tance of the country’s wealth to the default boundary inﬂuences the credit
spreads inversely as well, while an increasing size of the coupon leads to
higher spreads.
We compare sovereign debt to domestic corporate debt by analyzing the
impact of the bankruptcy scheme: While a sovereign will be litigated for the
principal, a corporation will be liquidated, i.e., all the assets of the corpora-
tion will be transferred to the lenders, minus the liquidation costs.
The stronger threat of liquidation leads corporates to wait longer until
they default than sovereigns. This leads to considerably lower spreads of
the corporate. If, in addition, we also assume lower liquidation costs for the
corporate, the spreads decrease even more.
The behavior of the credit spread curves is similar to the credit spreads
obtained by the classic models of corporate credit spreads such as Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz [32] and Leland and Toft [30].
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I provide a review of
the existing literature on sovereign debt. Section 3 describes the setup of
the model, while section 4 focuses on the determination of the endogenous
default boundary. Section 6 gives numerical simulations of the endogenous
default boundary and the resulting credit spreads. In section 7 we compare
sovereign and corporate debt. Section 8 concludes and discusses the model’s
limitations and potential extensions of the model.
2 Literature review
While there exists an extensive literature of corporate bankruptcy and credit
risk, sovereign credit risk is still a topic with rather little previous research.
The earliest models of sovereign debt focused on the role of debt as an
acceleration for countries’ economic growth, and sought to determine an op-
timal debt capacity for sovereigns. McDonald [33] provides a review of these
so-called ‘growth-cum-debt’ models.
A second string in the sovereign debt literature considers the question
5why sovereigns repay their debt at all. Since liquidation of sovereigns is not
enforceable, there is no direct way a lender can reclaim his assets in case of a
default. This could tempt sovereigns just to keep the remaining outstanding
debt service and hide behind their sovereignty. Reputation models let a
borrower loose its good reputation as a creditworthy borrower if they fail to
meet their obligations. A sovereign with bad reputation seeking to reﬁnance
its debt is repudiated by the lender banks.
Eaton and Gersowitz [14] present a model in which the sovereign uses
debt to smooth its consumption by borrowing in bad states of nature and
repaying debt in good states. Since a default would lead to a repudiation and
thus the lack of consumption smoothing possibilities, Eaton and Gersowitz
ﬁnd a competitive equilibrium in which sovereigns honor their debt.
Bulow and Rogoﬀ [6] show that debt is not the only way for a sovereign
to smooth shocks in its production. If the sovereign has assets denominated
in foreign currency, it can save and dissave to achieve the desired smoothing
eﬀect. They do not ﬁnd equilibrium without additional penalties such as
economic sanctions, because countries would not repay their debt if they do
have enough foreign assets to ensure the hedging of its output. Furthermore,
the competitive nature of the market for bank loans entails that the defaulted
sovereign will get access to new credits fairly easily, making the threat of
eternal repudiation fade.
In a second paper Bulow and Rogoﬀ [7] demonstrate that in equilibrium
lenders will always be willing to renegotiate the debt contract. Through the
threat of sanctions leading to disruption of trade which is beneﬁcial to the
borrower, the lender is able to force the borrower to repay at all. However,
the borrower will only use the fraction of its exports for debt repayments to
achieve an optimum between gains from keeping back part of the due debt
service and the cost of sanctions, and will constantly seek to recontract the
loan. This property is in accord with observed frequent renegotiations of
sovereign loan repayment programs.
Kulatilaka and Marcus [28] present a model that studies the timing deci-
sion of strategic defaults of sovereigns. They model a country’s stock GDP as
a continuous-time stochastic process. The burden of debt service induces a
drag on GDP growth which increases with greater debt-service to GDP ratio,
a relation characterized by an ad-hoc function. If the cost of the foregone
GDP growth due to debt service gets higher than the cost of the sanctions,
which come in form of a slump in stock GDP, the country chooses to default.
Since Kulatilaka and Marcus assume that the sovereign faces repudiation
risk, i.e., that it will not be able to take debt again after defaulting, which
implies that default is a one-time option. The authors use contingent-claims
analysis to numerically solve for the present value of consumption depending
6on the debt ratio, and for the responsiveness of the consumption gain induced
by the loan to the risk premium. They ﬁnd that the gain increases with the
variance of the GDP process, and decreases with the default penalty on stock
GDP and the GDP drag.
Gibson and Sundaresan [18] present a continuous-time model which starts
with a country that uses borrowing to generate exports. In the event of de-
fault, the sovereign is punished by trade sanctions as well as the seizing
of parts of the exports. The role of exports in the model is thus one of
imperfect collateral. The lenders can improve the recovery rate by seizing
exports. While sanctions only hurt the borrower without directly beneﬁtting
the lenders, the seized exports can be converted to money by the lenders.
The authors derive an optimal voluntary default rule by looking at the Nash
solution of a bargaining game where lenders and the borrower divide the
country’s wealth and future exports. Gibson and Sundaresan study the be-
havior of the sovereign’s credit spreads over risk free treasury and ﬁnd that
the existence of a threat of sanctions and seizing of exports improves the
value of sovereign debt.
There is little empirical evidence of sovereign defaults. While Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s rate sovereigns and include losses due to sovereign
default in their loss statistics, they do not list them separately. Banks do
possess loss statistics on their own loss experience with sovereign borrowers,
but if this information gets outside it is so aggregated as to be useless. See
for example Hurt and Felsovalyi [24].
While academia has focused on questions such as why sovereigns lend or
repay money at all and tried to determine optimal debt capacities, practical
research in the ﬁnancial community was faced with the task of assessing a
sovereign’s credit quality. Popular ratios used for the rating of the credit
quality of a sovereign include the debt-to-GDP ratio, the debt service-to-
exports ratio and the import cover (oﬃcial reserves divided by imports per
month), as well as analyzing the macroeconomic foundations and the political
environment of the country. Banks developed in-house rating systems which
transform these ratios and economic indicators into a score, or a cardinal
ranking, but still rely mainly on analysts’ judgement and experience.
Edwards [16] examined the relation between the yield spread on sovereign
debt on various macroeconomic variables to determine which best explain
government payments crises. More recent work in the area includes Boehmer
and Megginson [4]. Another approach consists in backing the dynamics of
credit quality out of sovereign bond prices by assuming a speciﬁc stochastic
process for the credit quality. Claessens and Pennacchi [8] derive the ﬁrst of
these models. They assume that credit quality is unobservable, but follows a
continuous diﬀusion process in the spirit of the Longstaﬀ and Schwartz [32]
7model for valuing corporate debt. They derive estimates of default probabil-
ities of Brady bonds and examine the inﬂuence of economic time series on
the default probabilities. Cumby and Evans [10] criticize that Claessens and
Pennacchi impose too many restrictions on the stochastic process governing
credit quality. Since more general stochastic processes are diﬃcult to solve
in closed form, Cumby and Evans move to discrete time and study three
processes by conducting speciﬁcation tests. Their results suggest that the
added ﬂexibility is important to ﬁt the term structures of credit spreads.
Duﬃe et al. [12] construct a model to price Russian dollar-denominated
bonds. They estimate the joint distribution of the term structure of LIBOR
swap and Russian bond yields by extending the model of Duﬃe and Singleton
[11]. Promised future cash ﬂows are discounted using a default-adjusted rate
equal to the risk free rate plus a credit spread which reﬂects the probability
and magnitude of a credit event. They allow for diﬀerent discount factors
since sovereign bonds usually do not have cross-default clauses.
Harvey [22] [21] conducts studies of the returns of emerging market bonds,
including sovereign bonds. Emerging market bond returns are highly variable
over time, and highly correlated with equity market returns in crises.
Recently banks try to extract probabilities of default out of traded bond
prices. However, lack of liquid markets for emerging market debt and het-
erogenous and intricate debt covenants complicate the undertaking. The
Portfolio Research department of J.P.Morgan [36] developed a framework to
price sovereign bonds by looking at the “credit fundamentals”: Similarly to
CreditMetrics, they use rating migration probabilities, recovery rates and
default probabilities to determine the spread which investors require to be
compensated for the default risk of sovereign bonds.
3 Speciﬁcation of the model
In our analysis of sovereign behavior we will consider a sovereign which has
written a bond denominated in foreign currency. We assume that the coun-
try’s wealth follows a Geometric Brownian Motion, and deﬁne it as the mar-
ket value of all assets either directly controlled by the sovereign’s government,
or indirectly controlled by the sovereign’s ability to seize assets on its terri-
tory, that can be converted into hard currency, for instance the US dollar.
This allows us to directly compare the country’s wealth with the promised
payments of the bond. The eﬀects of exchange rate changes are included
in the state variable determining country wealth and debt value. We will
postulate that the country seeks to maximize its wealth at the end of the
8bond’s life.
The holders of this bond are risk-neutral and identical investors. Their
only requirement is a non-negative expected return on their investment, i.e.,
they only buy the bond if they at least break even.
The sovereign can choose whether to fully repay the bond, or whether to
default: He will stop servicing the bond and oﬀer a new bond in exchange
which has a lower coupon and principal. The bond holders have the pos-
sibility to litigate the sovereign in order to try to seize at least part of the
due principal. Since there is no formal bankruptcy court for sovereigns the
litigation is diﬃcult for the borrowers: They might try to claim assets held
by the sovereign in a third country by battling in the courts of that coun-
try. This litigation process is costly not only in the explicit sense, i.e., high
lawyer fees, but also in the implicit sense: The enforceability of the borrow-
ers’ claims is weak. This means that they will be able to claim only a small
part of the principal. The sovereign will design its exchange oﬀer just such
that the bond holders will accept it.
Simultaneously with the default, the sovereign will incur costs of default-
ing: These costs include reputational costs, losing market access for both
trade and long term ﬁnancing, and experiencing of output losses due to a
lack of foreign capital for investments. However, we do not model these
diﬀerent costs of default separately but instead subsume them into a single
parameter which reduces the country’s growth rate of wealth. The costs of
defaulting in our model are thus lost growth opportunities and hence lower
expected wealth in the future.
By assumption, we model the relative change in the country’s wealth Rt
as a geometric Brownian motion.
dRt =( µ − δ)Rtdt + σRtdWt (1)
µ is the growth rate of wealth. δ is the outﬂow, comprising consumption
and debt service. σRtdWt is a diﬀusion term to depict changes in foreign
currency denominated wealth due to shocks to the economy, either in the
real economy or through the currency market.
The sovereign has a single bond outstanding with maturity T,p r i n c i p a l
P, paying a coupon rate c. The outﬂow rate δ includes the debt service
payments cP as well as the consumption of the sovereign7.
Default occurs when country wealth falls under a critical value Kt which
we call the default boundary. If the country wealth decreases, the costs of
default decrease as well since they are assumed to be proportional to the
country’s wealth. The beneﬁts of defaulting, i.e., the reduced debt service
payments, remain constant since they are linked to the principal of the bond
9and thus independent of the country’s wealth. Hence, if country wealth falls
enough such that the costs and beneﬁts of defaulting are equal, the default
boundary is reached at which the sovereign decides to default.
In this section we will ﬁrst leave Kt as an exogenous, known constant
(Kt will be endogenized in section 4). If the sovereign defaults at time t,
it oﬀers a new bond in exchange which promises to pay only a fraction α
of the original contractual obligations8. This implies that total debt service
from that moment on will only be αcP with a ﬁnal principal repayment of
αP9. However, in this ﬁrst step we will keep α as a known constant. We will
endogenize the exchange oﬀer and the parameter α in section 5.
The negative consequences of default for the sovereign are that the coun-
try has to suﬀer a deduction λRtdt in its foreign currency ﬂow. I.e., from
then on the country’s wealth will switch to a lower growth rate10.A ni n t e r -
pretation of λ is that the lender countries enact a trade embargo against the
sovereign which curbs its exports, thus generating less foreign currency rev-
enue. But we also have to think of “informal” trade sanctions in the sense of
a loss of the country’s reputation as a sound trade partner. For instance, in-
ternational banks might be reluctant to ﬁnance trades between corporations
after a default, rendering trade with the country more diﬃcult.
The change in wealth after default is
dR
D
t =( µ − δ − λ)R
D
t dt + σR
D
t dWt (2)
We can calculate the value of a single bond with coupon rate c,p r i n c i p a l
P and maturity T as follows, where f(s;Rt,K) is the density of the ﬁrst
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The ﬁrst term is the expected value of the stream of discounted coupon
payments given that the sovereign is solvent. The probability of this event
is the complement of the probability that the country’s wealth hits the re-
organization boundary K over the life of the bond. The second term is the
expected discounted principal repayment given that the sovereign remained
10solvent until maturity. The third term are the expected discounted coupon
payments αc of the rescheduled debt after default, and the reduced expected
discounted principal repayment αP in case of a default prior to maturity.


































which we can further simplify to ﬁnd the value of the bond.
Proposition 1 The value of a sovereign bond paying a coupon rate of c
p.a. and a principal P at maturity T, and which, after country wealth falls
below a constant default triggering country wealth level K, i.e., after default
is exchanged into a bond paying a coupon rate of αc and a ﬁnal repayment



























A solution for F(T;Rt,K) can be found in Harrison [20], and a solution
for
  T
0 e−rsf(s;Rt,K)ds is contained in Rubinstein and Reiner [38]. These















































4 Endogenous default boundary
So far we have treated the default boundary K as exogenous and constant.
Now we will think of the sovereign trying to maximize its wealth net of
consumption and including the repayment of the principal at the end of the
bond’s life. This expected terminal wealth depends on the decisions of the
sovereign: At each time s prior to maturity T the sovereign decides whether
to default or not by comparing the value of the two strategies.
Denoting s as the hitting time of Rt to the boundary Kt,w ed e ﬁ n eVt(s)
as the country’s expected wealth net of consumption, but including debt
payments. Its dynamics depend on the sovereigns decision to default: Prior
to default, the growth rate of Vt(s) is the growth rate of country wealth µ
minus the contractual coupon payments cP. After default, Vt(s) grows with
a reduced growth rate of µ − λ due to the damage of the trade disruptions,
reputation loss etc. caused by the default, but only minus debt payments of
αcP because of the smaller coupon. We assume that the sovereign remains
unlevered after maturity of the bond, i.e., it does not have to service any
coupons anymore, but if it defaulted, it will continue to suﬀer the damage λ.
Assuming that the sovereign defaults at s,w et h u sd e ﬁ n eVt(s)a s( T om a k e
clearer whether we mean the dynamics after default or after non-default we
write V D
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µV N
t dt + σV N
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(µ − λ)V D
t dt + σV D
t dWt if T>sand t>T
(7)
Furthermore, at T the sovereign repays the principal. We therefore deﬁne





t (s) − P if T<s
V D
t (s) − αP if T>s (8)
denoting the time just after repayment of the principal as T ∗.I n o t h e r
words, if the sovereign defaulted before maturity of the bond, it will only
repay α of the principal P. If it did not default, it repays the full principal
P.
The value of the strategy not to default, UN(s), is the expected coun-
try wealth, net of consumption, capitalized at T, after debt repayment and
conditional on no default at s is
U
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− P. (9)
If the country would decide to default at s, it would beneﬁt of the lower
coupon αc and principal αP of the exchanged bond, but its wealth would
grow at the smaller growth rate given in (2) since it suﬀers the deduction
due to the sanctions and worsened trade environment. This reduced growth
rate continues also after the maturity of the bond. Hence, the sovereign
must incorporate the future loss in growth after the maturity of the bond
into its decision. As we assumed that the sovereign remains unlevered after
maturity of the bond, the dynamics of V D
t (s), i.e., the country’s wealth net
of consumption are given by dV D
t (s)=( µ − λ)V D
t (s)dt + σV D
t (s)dWt,w i t h
t>Tand s<T . If the country had not defaulted at s, its wealth would
evolve with dV N
t (s)=µV N
t dt + σV N
t dWt with t>T . The log-diﬀerence
between the two trends is thus dlnV D
t − dlnV N
t = −λdt. This allows us to
calculate the expected discounted growth loss after maturity ∆V , capitalized
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− αP is the expected country
wealth just after repayment of the principal. We can thus calculate UD(s),
the expected value of the default strategy, capitalized at time T:I ti st h e
expected net of consumption country wealth at T, given that the sovereign
defaulted at s, including the costs of default and the reduced debt service
payments, minus the repayment of the principal and the expected discounted

















































It is optimal to default at time s when the expected value of defaulting,
UD(s), exceeds the expected value of continuing to fully service the bond,
UN(s), conditional on the information set at time s. At the default boundary
K(s,T,α) those values are equal, and the sovereign is indiﬀerent between de-
faulting and continuing to honor its contractual obligations. We can therefore


























To solve for K(s,T,α) we need to calculate the conditional expectation


































in case of no default. The derivations of equations (13) and (14) can be
found in appendix B. We can therefore solve (12).
14Proposition 2 The sovereign will default, i.e., stop servicing the original
bond and oﬀer a new bond in exchange with a reduced coupon rate of αc
and a principal of αP, when its wealth hits the endogenous default boundary

















To fully understand the sovereign’s decision to default, we have to realize
that the debt service payments and thus the potential beneﬁts of default are
independent of the level of wealth. The cost of default is a function of the
level of the country’s wealth, however. Therefore, if wealth falls below the
endogenous default boundary, the cost of default falls below the beneﬁts of
reduced coupon payments.
Furthermore, note that the sovereign will always default before its wealth
reaches zero since K(s,T,α) is positive for any choice of parameters. In
other words, the sovereign will never default due to liquidity reasons,s i n c e
the endogenous default boundary where it chooses to default is always higher
than zero, i.e., the point at which it has to default. A proof can be found in
appendix C.
4.1 Valuation of the bond with time-dependent en-
dogenous default boundary K(s,T,α)
Since the endogenized default boundary K(s,T,α)i stime-dependent,w e
cannot use the formulas in (5) and (6) to calculate the ﬁrst-passage time
densities in order to value the bond, since they require a constant boundary.
The boundary K(s,T,α), however, is curved.
Still, by transforming the process of Rt we can use a result by Durbin [13]
to compute the ﬁrst-passage time densities.
Durbin shows that the ﬁrst-passage density of a Brownian motion Wt to
























where a (s) is the derivative of a(s), φ(s) is the density of the Brownian
motion Wt at time s, evaluated at a(s), and φ(u,s) is the joint density of Wτ
at times u and s, evaluated at a(u)a n da(s).
In our model default occurs if the country wealth Rt hits the boundary
Kt from above. We transform the problem into the ﬁrst hitting time of a
































































Furthermore, we need the density of the Brownian motion Wt at time s




























We can thus easily compute the cumulative probability of default F(T −
t;A(s)) =
  T
t f(s,t,A(s))ds and the expression
  T
t e−rsf(s,t,A(s))ds with
f(s,t,A(s)) as deﬁned by (16) and A(s) as deﬁned by (17). These results we
enter into equation (4), yielding the value of the bond:
Proposition 3 The value of a sovereign bond paying a coupon rate of c p.a.
and a principal P at maturity T, and which, after country wealth falls below
an endogenous default triggering country wealth level K(s,T,α), determined
by the sovereign seeking to maximize terminal wealth, , i.e., after default is
exchanged into a bond paying a coupon rate of αc and a ﬁnal repayment of













































































































































4.2 Special Case: Inﬁnite maturity sovereign bond








We can thus apply the valuation given in Proposition 1 to get the value























185 Endogenizing the repayment fraction α
When the sovereign reaches the default boundary K(s,T,α), it proposes to
the lenders to exchange the current bond against a new bond with the same
maturity, but paying only a fraction α of the originally promised coupon c
and principal P. Assuming this happens at time s, the market value of this
new bond would be b(s,T;Rs,αc,αP,A(s)).
The lenders can reject the oﬀer, litigate the country and try to seize
assets of the sovereign held abroad in order to recuperate their losses. They
cannot seize the full principal, however, but only a fraction (1 − γ)P 12.T h e
nature of these litigation costs is both explicit and implicit. Explicit costs
of litigation are the costs of battling in court, and the costs of converting
the seized assets in cash. For example, the lenders might be able to achieve
the seizure of aircrafts belonging to the sovereign’s national airline for which
they will ﬁrst have to ﬁnd a buyer.
The implicit costs of litigation come from the weak enforceability of the
debt contract. The borrowers are not able to claim the total principal in a
formal bankruptcy court. Instead they have to try to lay their hands on assets
of the sovereign held in third countries by claiming them in the courts of the
third country. Most of the principal will be beyond their grasp, however,
leading to a large litigation cost parameter γ. In fact, most of the litigation
costs are implicit.
The lenders will accept the new bonds if their market value is not smaller
than the proceedings from litigating the sovereign. Since the sovereign pro-
poses the bond exchange, and litigation is costly, it will oﬀer a repayment
fraction α such that the lenders will not litigate.
Proposition 4 The endogenous repayment fraction α is the α∗ which solves
the following equation:
b(t,T;Rs,α
∗,A(s)) = (1 − γ)P (24)
i.e., the α∗ which makes the market value of the new bonds with reduced
coupon and principal payments equal to the gains from litigating the sovereign
and recuperating part of the principal. Furthermore, with default at time s
19we have Rs = K(s,T,α∗), resulting in
b(t,T;K(s,T,α
∗),α
∗,A(s)) = (1 − γ)P (25)
Proposition 3 provided a closed form solution for the value of the bond.
We use this formula to numerically solve for the α∗ which makes the price of
the renegotiated bond and the litigation value equal.
Inserting the obtained α∗ into the equations given in proposition 3 yields
the price of the sovereign bond today, i.e., b(t,T;Rt,α ∗,A(s)).
6 Numerical results
For the numerical analysis of the sensitivities of the endogenous repayment
fraction α, the endogenous default boundary Kt and the sovereign credit
spreads we need realistic estimates of the parameter values so that the ob-
tained spreads will be close to the observed spreads of emerging market
bonds.
We will use the parameter values for the interest rate r =0 .05, for the
principal P = 100, for the coupon rate c =0 .1.
To obtain a order of magnitude for the litigation costs, which are diﬃcult
to estimate since defaults on public debt have been rare, we will follow a J.P.
Morgan Research article [37] in noting that Ecuadorian, Russian and Ivory
Coast PDIs have been trading around 20% of principal just before default or
a bond exchange respectively. Since the default probability of these bonds
was very near to 1 just prior to the default event, we can take their value as
an indication of the recovery rate of sovereign bonds. We will therefore use
an estimate of the litigation costs of γ =0 .8 for the analysis. This means
that the bond holders could regain 20% of the principal through litigation.
For the volatility of country wealth we will assume a σ = 60% to be in line
with the long-term average volatilities of emerging market stock markets.
The costs of default are diﬃcult to estimate as well. They consist of the
impact of direct sanctions, e.g., a trade embargo, on the growth of the coun-
try’s wealth. But they also encompass indirect costs, i.e., a loss of reputation
as a trustworthy partner in business, or the lost access to international ﬁ-
nancial markets. Bulow and Rogoﬀ [6] cite studies which show that the cost
of sanctions are not very high. Similarly, we will assume a yearly cost of
λ = 4% in lost wealth for defaults.
20With the exception of the analysis of the sensitivity to the time to matu-
rity of the bond, we will use a maturity of T =1 0y e a r s .
For the valuation of the bond and the calculation of the credit spreads we
need to assume the current level of country wealth. We will select Rt = 200
since this is close enough to the outstanding principal of the bond to ensure
that the parameters’ impact on the credit spreads are material.
By numerically solving for the endogenous repayment fraction given in
equation (25) and inserting the solution for the endogenous default boundary
given in equation (15) into the valuation formula of the bond (4, 5 and 6) we
obtain the price of the bond, which can be used for calculating the spread







(1 − e−rT) cP
r + Pe −rT (26)
Figures 1 to 18 show the spreads which we obtain by the model. They
show the same order of magnitude as the spreads of emerging market sove-
reigns: In Rappaport [37] we see that in October 2000, the market spread
of sovereign bonds ranged from about 100 for BBB rated countries such as
Korea and China to 2000 for countries near Default such as Ivory Coast,
Nigeria, Ecuador and Russia, rated CCC. The numerical simulations show
that the major impact in determining the spreads of the sovereign bonds
is the distance to default, i.e., the ratio of country wealth to outstanding
principal, and the litigation costs, i.e., how big a part principal could the
bond holders seize by litigation in case of a complete default, i.e., if the
sovereign would not propose a bond exchange.
6.1 Dependence on litigation costs γ
The litigation costs γ determine the recovery rate in the case of litigation.
Part of the recovered principal will have to be used to pay for legal and
lawyer fees, and part of the principal cannot be claimed due to the limited
enforceability of the sovereign debt contract. Since the sovereign will propose
a new debt contract such that the lenders will be indiﬀerent between litigating
and accepting the reduced payments, higher litigation costs mean that the
sovereign can propose a less valuable bond in exchange to the original bond
if litigation costs are high. Figure 2 shows this relation. A lower repayment
fraction α in turn implies that defaulting is more attractive. We can see this
in ﬁgure 3 by the relation between γ and the default boundary Kt: The higher
21γ, the higher Kt, i.e., the sooner the sovereign will choose to default. These
two eﬀects together lead to rapidly rising credit spreads as the litigation costs
increase, shown in ﬁgure 1.
6.2 Dependence on initial country wealth Rt
Obviously, the lower the initial country wealth, the higher the probability
that the wealth will hit the default boundary Kt leading to the country’s
default. This eﬀect is oﬀset slightly by the cost of defaulting which decreases
together with country wealth, since they come in a loss in wealth growth
which is proportional to the level of wealth. This leads to a increasing de-
fault boundary with higher country wealth (Figure 6). However, this eﬀect
is negligible compared to the increased probability of default. Due to the
higher probability of default, the new bonds oﬀered by the sovereign in a
bond exchange are less valuable, c.p. Hence the sovereign has to increase
the promised coupon rate of the new bonds to induce the bond holders to
accept the oﬀer. Therefore, the endogenous repayment fraction α increases
as country wealth decreases (Figure 5). But these two eﬀects are dwarfed by
the increased probability of default caused by a smaller distance to default:
Figure 4 shows how the increasing default probability leads to higher spreads
over credit risk-free bonds.
6.3 Dependence on sanction rate λ
The costlyness of defaulting, though e.g. direct sanctions, trade disruptions
and reputation loss and spillovers, is what keeps sovereigns from defaulting
right away in our model. The higher the growth rate loss λ, i.e., the higher
the costs of sanctions in present value terms, the less attractive is the option
to default. But since the costs of default are proportional to the country
wealth level, whereas the beneﬁts of defaulting are not, the sovereign will
still decide to default, albeit only at lower levels of wealth, or, in other
words, it will wait longer until it defaults. We can see how the endogenous
default boundary Kt decreases as λ increases in ﬁgure 9. This in turn leads
to lower probabilities of default and hence lower credit spreads (Figure 7).
These lower probabilities of default means that the sovereign can propose a
bond with a lower coupon, since the probability that it will default again on
the new bonds is small. However, this eﬀect on the endogenous repayment
fraction α is small (Figure 8).
226.4 Dependence on country wealth volatility σ
The higher the volatility of the underlying country wealth process, the bigger
the probability that the country wealth will fall below the endogenous default
boundary Kt, triggering default. This is also true for the new bonds the
sovereign oﬀers in exchange for the original bond. As can be seen in ﬁgure
11, the conditions of the bond exchange have to be improved in order to
ensure acceptance by the bond holders: The repayment fraction α increases
with higher volatility. As the beneﬁts of defaulting, i.e., the saved coupon
payments, get smaller, the endogenous default boundary declines, as shown
in ﬁgure 12: The sovereign will wait longer until it decides to default.
These two eﬀects determine the low volatility end of the shape of the
credit spreads: First, at low levels of country wealth volatility, the high
default boundary Kt and hence high default probability, together with a less
attractive exchange oﬀer, lead to high credit spreads (Figure 10). As country
wealth volatility increases, the better exchange oﬀer together with the lower
default boundary decrease credit spreads. At a level of about 30%, however,
the direct eﬀect takes over: The higher the volatility of country wealth, the
higher the probability that the country wealth will hit the default boundary.
This direct eﬀect increases the credit spreads.
6.5 Dependence on coupon rate c
In ﬁgure 13 the relation between coupon rate c and the sovereign’s credit
spread is shown. It is more tempting to default on a bond with high coupon
payments since this entails a greater saving for the sovereign. This leads to a
higher rescheduling boundary Kt as the coupon rate c increases (Figure 15).
This in turn compels the sovereign to oﬀer better conditions in the bond
exchange to ensure that the bond holders accept the oﬀer, leading to an
increasing coupon rate αc of the new bonds (Figure 14). Since the sovereign
will default at higher levels of wealth, its default probability is higher and
hence the credit spreads increase with the coupon rate (Figure 13).
6.6 Dependence on maturity of the bond T
Figure 16 shows the credit spread term structure. For short term bonds
the probability that country wealth will fall under the default boundary is
very low, and hence the debt is almost risk free. This probability rises very
fast however, and we observe a characteristic “hump” at maturities around
232 years. With longer maturities, the spreads decrease again. The reasons for
this behavior are the following:
While the costs of defaulting, i.e., the loss of country wealth growth
through direct sanctions, reputation loss etc., are independent of the time to
maturity of the bond, the beneﬁts of defaulting are dependent on the time
to maturity of the bond through two links:
1. Discounting: If a cash ﬂow is further away in time, it will be discounted
more. This means that it will be smaller in present value terms.
2. Lifetime: The sovereign pays the coupon continuously. Therefore the
total coupon payments on a long-term bond are higher than the total
coupon payments on bond with the same coupon rate but a shorter
maturity.
These two eﬀect explain the behavior of the default boundary in ﬁgure
18 and bond exchange in ﬁgure 17:
Defaulting on a bond shortly before it matures is attractive since one
can save part of the principal. Therefore, the endogenous default boundary
is high for short maturity bonds. As the maturity of the bond increases,
however, this gain gets smaller in present value terms, making default less
attractive: The default boundary drops with increasing maturity, as can be
seen in ﬁgure 18.
The level of the default boundary inﬂuences the endogenous repayment
fraction α, i.e., the conditions of the new bonds the sovereign proposes in
exchange. In ﬁgure 18 we see that longer maturity bonds have higher en-
dogenous default boundaries and thus lower probability of default than short
maturity bonds. Their value is thus higher. Since, in the event of default, the
sovereign proposes an exchange oﬀer against bonds with the same maturity
as the original bonds. It can therefore oﬀer a lower coupon and principal for
long maturity bonds and still induce the bondholders to tender.
Now we can explain the hump-shaped credit spread curve in ﬁgure 16:
At maturities very close to zero, the probability that the country wealth
will reach the level which triggers default is very small, and credit spreads
are small as well. They increase rapidly with increasing maturities, however,
since the probability that the country will default increases as well. For longer
maturities the spreads decrease again because of the increasing coupon of the
bond oﬀered in the bond exchange during default. To recall, the increasing α
is due to the fact that litigation yields (1−γ)P in present value terms, while
accepting the bond exchange promises e−r(T−s)αP in present value terms,
which decreases with increasing time to maturity.
24Figure 19 shows the credit spread curves for diﬀering levels of initial
country wealth: The higher the initial level of country wealth, or, in other
words, the higher the distance to default of the sovereign, the less pronounced
is the hump shape of the credit curves.
The behavior of the credit spread curves is similar to the credit spreads
obtained by the classic models of corporate credit spreads such as Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz [32] and Leland and Toft [30].
7 Comparison to otherwise equal domestic
corporate bonds
In section 5 we determined the repayment fraction α by assuming that the
sovereign will always propose a bond exchange against a bond with a coupon
rate such that the value of the new bonds with the reduced payments will
be equal to the gains the lenders could obtain from litigating the country.
We furthermore assumed that the lenders cannot litigate for more than the
principal of the outstanding bonds, and that they incur costs of γP should
they litigate. This allowed us to write proposition 4.
If the defaulting party is a domestic corporation13, however, it will be
subject to a bankruptcy code. This means that the lenders are able to
liquidate the company, and thus claim all assets of the borrower. In doing
this they will again incur costs, which we will denote by γcorp as well.
Proposition 5 In our framework, if the counterparty is a corporation and




∗,A(s)) = (1 − γ)K(s,T,α
∗) (27)
The main diﬀerence to the sovereign case is that the recovery rate is now
dependent on the value of assets of the borrower. If a sovereign borrower
decides to default even though its wealth is high, the lenders cannot get more
than the principal of the bond minus the litigation costs. If the borrower is a
corporate, the lenders could threaten to liquidate14, inducing the borrower to
not default at high wealth levels. Furthermore, the existence of a bankruptcy
code implies lower costs, so that we would assume that γsov >γ corp.
25In the numerical analysis given in ﬁgures 20 to 22, we ﬁrst use the same pa-
rameters of γsov = γcorp =0 .8a n dσ =0 .6 for both corporate and sovereign,
to isolate the impact of liquidating versus litigating. Then we also reduce
the liquidation costs of the sovereign to see the further reduction in spreads.
The graph for the default boundary in ﬁgure 22 shows that a corporation’s
default boundary is lower than a sovereign’s: The threat to access the whole
wealth through liquidation, in the corporate case, is stronger than the threat
to only seize the principal through litigation, in the sovereign case.
This stronger threat in turn leads the corporate to oﬀer a more attractive
bond exchange than the sovereign. Together, the lower probability of default,
and the more attractive exchange oﬀer lead to considerably lower spreads of
the corporate, as shown in ﬁgure 20. If, in addition, we also assume lower
liquidation costs for the corporate, the spreads decrease even more.
8 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the decision of a sovereign whether to continue to honor
its bond, or whether to default, i.e., whether to propose an exchange against
a less valuable bond.
Numerical analysis showed that the most important parameters which
inﬂuence the credit spreads of a sovereign are the fraction of principal that
could be recuperated through litigation, the distance of the country’s wealth
to the default boundary, the size of the coupon and the volatility of country
wealth. Using a set of reasonable parameters, we obtain credit spreads of a
size compatible with spreads observed on sovereign bond markets.
The behavior of the credit spread curves is similar to the credit spreads
obtained by the classic models of corporate credit spreads such as Longstaﬀ
and Schwartz [32] and Leland and Toft [30].
A comparison to corporate debt shows, consistent with the stylized fact
that sovereign debt is more risky than equally rated corporate debt, that
otherwise equal corporate bonds have a lower spread than sovereign bonds,
due to the stronger threat of liquidation.
Our model explains another stylized fact of sovereign defaults: Sovereigns
tend to default on bonds close to maturity15. Indeed our model shows that
sovereign bonds with maturities between 6 months and 2 years have very
high spreads, reﬂecting the high probability of default.
The model could be implemented to price sovereign debt. However, es-
timation of some of the parameters, such as, for example, the impact of
economic sanctions or the amount which could be won through litigation, is
26diﬃcult. This is a general problem of structural models of sovereign debt, as
most of the variables are unobservable since the value of a sovereign is not
traded, unlike the value of a corporation.
A problem in our model is that the sanctions imposed by the lenders in
the case of default are not negotiation proof. If the sovereign, after default
and the imposition of sanctions, oﬀers a small amount of money to lenders
if they stop the sanctions, the lenders would accept since they do not proﬁt
from the sanctions themselves. This is a general problem of sanction-based
punishment in sovereign credit models, and can only be solved in a repeated
game setting.
Sovereigns do not default on their total debt. In fact, Ecuador tried
to circumvent the invoking of cross default clauses to prevent its Eurobond
defaulting. In our model, where the sovereign has just one bond outstanding,
however, it is not possible to analyze partial defaults. The extension into a
setting where the sovereign has diﬀerent kind of bonds outstanding with
diﬀering features would allow us to examine a sovereign’s behavior during
default.
Also we assume the lenders to be homogeneous: They either all tender
or they all reject the oﬀer. In reality however, we see a much richer process:
The tender leaders try to convince the necessary majority to tender, and the
majority and the sovereign try to protect themselves against litigation by the
hold-outs.
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30A Figures
Figure 1: Credit spreads as a function of the litigation loss γ. Parameters
are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
31Figure 2: Endogenous repayment fraction α as a function of the litigation
loss γ. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6,
λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
32Figure 3: Endogenous default boundary Kt as a function of the litigation loss
γ. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, λ =0 .04
and T = 10.
33Figure 4: Credit spreads as a function of the initial country wealth Rt.P a -
rameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8, λ =0 .04 and
T = 10.
34Figure 5: Endogenous repayment fraction α as a function of the initial coun-
try wealth Rt. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8,
λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
35Figure 6: Endogenous default boundary Kt as a function of the initial country
wealth Rt. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8,
λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
36Figure 7: Credit spreads as a function of the sanction rate λ. Parameters
are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8a n dT = 10.
37Figure 8: Endogenous repayment fraction α as a function of the sanction rate
λ. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8
and T = 10.
38Figure 9: Endogenous default boundary Kt as a function of the sanction rate
λ. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8
and T = 10.
39Figure 10: Credit spreads as a function of the country wealth volatility σ.
Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1, γ =0 .8, λ =0 .04 and
T = 10.
40Figure 11: Endogenous repayment fraction α as a function of the country
wealth volatility σ. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1,
γ =0 .8, λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
41Figure 12: Endogenous default boundary Kt as a function of the country
wealth volatility σ. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, c =0 .1,
γ =0 .8, λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
42Figure 13: Credit spreads as a function of the coupon rate c. Parameters are
r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8, λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
43Figure 14: Endogenous repayment fraction α as a function of the coupon
rate c. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8,
λ =0 .04 and T = 10.
44Figure 15: Endogenous default boundary Kt as a function of the coupon rate
c. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, σ =0 .6, γ =0 .8, λ =0 .04
and T = 10.
45Figure 16: Credit spreads as a function of the maturity of the bond T.
Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, σ =0 .6, c =0 .1, γ =0 .8a n d
λ =0 .04.
46Figure 17: Endogenous repayment fraction α as a function of the maturity of
the bond T. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, σ =0 .6, c =0 .1,
γ =0 .8a n dλ =0 .04.
47Figure 18: Endogenous default boundary Kt as a function of the maturity of
the bond T. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, Rt = 200, σ =0 .6, c =0 .1,
γ =0 .8a n dλ =0 .04.
48Figure 19: Credit spreads as a function of the maturity of the bond T for
diﬀerent levels of initial wealth Rt from 170 (highest spreads) to 260 (lowest).
Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, σ =0 .6, c =0 .1, γ =0 .8a n dλ =0 .04.
49Figure 20: Credit spreads of sovereigns and corporates as a function of the
maturity of the bond T. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100, σ =0 .6, c =0 .1,
γ =0 .8a n dλ =0 .04. The solid line shows a sovereign bond’s credit spreads
and default boundary, respectively, while the dashed line shows a corporate
bond.
50Figure 21: Endogenous repayment fraction α of sovereigns and corporates as
a function of the maturity of the bond T. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100,
σ =0 .6, c =0 .1, γ =0 .8a n dλ =0 .04. The solid line shows a sovereign
bond’s credit spreads and default boundary, respectively, while the dashed
line shows a corporate bond.
51Figure 22: Endogenous default boundary Kt of sovereigns and corporates as
a function of the maturity of the bond T. Parameters are r =0 .05, P = 100,
σ =0 .6, c =0 .1, γ =0 .8a n dλ =0 .04. The solid line shows a sovereign
bond’s credit spreads and default boundary, respectively, while the dashed
line shows a corporate bond.
52B Calculation of Es[VT|s<T]
The dynamics of Vt follow
dVt =( ( µ − λ)Vt − αcP)dt + σVtdWt
for t<Tand s<T, i.e., before maturity of the bond and given default at
s. Karatzas and Shreve [26] provide a general solution for one-dimensional
linear equations, with which we can calculate Vt, given default at s.16.













Deﬁning Zt = e(µ−λ− 1
2σ2)t+σWt, we calculate the conditional expectation
as














































































































C Proof that the endogenous default bound-
ary K(s,T,α) is positive

















Since the parameters P, c, r, µ, λ and T −t are restricted to be positive,





































r+λ < 1, 0 <α<1a n deµ(T−t)−1
µ > e(µ−λ)(T−t)−1
µ−λ .
Therefore, since K(s,T,α) is a division of two positive numbers, K(s,T,α)
must be positive.
54Notes
1Although we do not model reputation directly since the sovereign does
not borrow repeatedly, we can think of a loss of reputation which decreases
his future growth opportunities, leading to a lower growth rate of country
wealth.
2See the IMF International Capital Markets Survey 2000 [17] for details.
3Bonds issued in 1997 in exchange for London Club principal (Prins) and
for interest arrears (Ians).
4The old bonds were issued by Vnesheconombank and not guaranteed by
Russia. The change in obligor was valuable since creditors had little legal
recourse against Vnesheconombank.
5One of the major hindrances in the litigation of defaulted sovereigns by
legal ﬁrms specialized in the investemt in distressed debt was the “Cham-
perty” defense: Under New York law, a creditor is not allowed to buy debt
with “the intent and sole purpose to sue”. In October 1999, Elliot Associates,
was able to revoke the use of the “Champerty” defense and laid claim assets
in accounts at Chase Manhattan, a ﬁscal agent of Peru, wich were intended
for a a coupon payment of a Brady bond issued by Peru. In order to prevent
a default on the Brady bond the sovereign chose to pay the contested assets
to Elliot. See Lindenbaum and Duran [31] for details.
6We assume that the lenders are identical and risk neutral. In particu-
lar, we do not consider the possibility that some lenders do not accept the
55tender in order to litigate separately later on. Following this strategy, they
would be able to recuperate a larger fraction of the principal, since they do
not have to share the seized assets with the bond holders who accepted the
exchange oﬀer. To prevent this type of behavior, sovereign bond exchanges
normally include collective action clauses which ensure that the majority of
bond holders can legally bind the minority, or which ensure that the pro-
ceedings of litigation will also have to be shared with the bond holders which
accepted the exchange. The exchange oﬀer of Ecuador in July 2000 included
a legal innovation: While changes to payment terms of a bond contract re-
quire unanimity of bond holders, changes to non-payment terms only require
51% to 75% of votes. The majority of the bond holders thus rendered the
old bonds unattractive through e.g. stripping away of cross-default clauses,
reducing the liquidity of the old bonds by delisting them and other clauses
increasing bond value. See Lindenbaum and Duran [31] for details.
7We assume that the sovereign will always consume an amount such that
the total of consumption and debt service will be equal to the outﬂow rate
δ. In other words, we impose that the consumption is equal to δ − cP
Rt,s u c h






8As stated in the introduction, sovereigns usually oﬀer bonds with a longer
maturity than the original bonds, a fact which we do not model directly. This
prolongation of the maturity can be included easily into our model, however,
by noting that a delaying of the payment of a cash ﬂow causes a reduction in
present value terms. For instance, the sovereign oﬀers to repay the principal
only at T   >Tinstead at T, as originally promised. For the bond holders
this implies a loss of
 
1 − e−r(T −T)
 
P since they will receive the principal
56T   − T years later than promised. This would mean a reduction in principal
of α = e−r(T −T).
9Contrary to Gibson and Sundaresan [18] I assume that it is not possible
for the lenders to seize a fraction of the exports generated by the country.
By litigating the lenders cannot recuperate more than the principal of the
bond minus the litigation costs.
10This amounts to a reduction in the expected capitalized country wealth,
as we will see later on.
11Note that this valuation of the bond only allows for a single default, i.e.,
a single reduction in the coupon and principal payments. The possibility of
a second default on the new bonds is not considered.
12This is a major diﬀerence to Gibson and Sundaresan [18] who assume
that the recovery value is the result of a dividing up of country wealth and
future exports of the country. Here it is assumed that the lenders cannot
seize more than the principal minus litigation costs, i.e., the recovery value
is not a function of country wealth.
13We will compare sovereign debt to debt issued by domestic corporations.
Speciﬁcally, we do not look at debt issued by foreign corporations which is
subject to transfer risk and thus to sovereign risk as well.
14We still allow renegotiation of debt, i.e., the lenders only threaten to
liquidate, and the corporation will propose a bond exchange such that the
bond holders will not liquidate the company.
5715See the IMF International Capital Markets Survey 2000 [17] for details.
16We will solve for Es [VT|s<T] since the solution for Es [VT|s>T] follows
automatically by setting α =1a n dλ =0 .
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